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 Abstract 
 Th is article examines the conﬂ ict between people’s associative duties and their wider obligations 
of global justice. After clarifying the nature of associative duties, it defends the view that such 
duties may be civic in nature: obtaining between citizens, not just friends and families. Samuel 
Scheﬄ  er’s ‘distributive objection’ to civic associative duties is then presented in the context of 
global distributive injustice. Th ree solutions to the objection are considered. One is that the 
distributive objection is more a philosophical puzzle than a practical problem because of the 
means by which global justice would be achieved. Th is is only partially correct. Th e second reply 
is that associative duties are additional to citizens’ more cosmopolitan duties. Th is reply loses its 
purchase if global justice is conceived of in comparative terms. Th e third reply claims that 
associative duties are justiﬁ ed by genuine values and do not disappear even when over-ridden by 
more weighty moral concerns. While in practice, our duties to engineer global justice are likely 
to over-ride our associative duties in the near future, in ideal circumstances the two kinds of 
duties can co-exist. 
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 Associative duties are duties we owe to people with whom we are associated in 
some way, family members, friends, neighbours and, according to some, even 
compatriots. Political philosophers are fond of elaborating grand principles of 
justice or human rights, but associative duties make up most of the substance 
of everyday morality. Associative duties supply moral reasons why parents care 
for their children, neighbours look in on the old person next door, and 
 compatriots pay taxes to provide each other with hospitals, schools and 
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universities. Associative duties are real, tangible and concrete in a way that 
abstract principles are not. In fact, for most people most of the time felt asso-
ciative duties generally outweigh universal cosmopolitan duties to help strang-
ers in need. 1 For anyone interested in the interests of people in the developing 
world, therefore, associative duties represent a severe obstacle. From a ‘com-
mon sense’ point of view, it is natural that we direct our energies into helping 
our own, but from a cosmopolitan perspective it appears an unjustiﬁ able priv-
ilege. Cosmopolitan writers regard people’s local allegiance as a parochial 
obstacle that stands in the way of achieving global distributive justice. Th is 
puts them at odds with most citizens’ felt moral understanding. My aim here 
is to investigate various ways this conﬂ ict might be overcome. 
 I begin with some preliminary comments to clarify the nature of associative 
duties. Th e fact that we enjoy social relationships with certain people is what 
advocates of associative duties turn to for their moral justiﬁ cation. 2 Relation-
ships supply a justiﬁ able distinction between the worth of all persons to whom 
we owe  (universal) duties and the worth of certain people—such as fellow 
citizens—to whom we owe associative duties. Th ere are, however, other ways 
of making that distinction. In particular, associative duties are not the same as 
other kinds of special duties. All special duties only obtain between certain 
groups of people, but only associative duties are justiﬁ ed by the relationship 
those people share. Th at is the ﬁ rst clariﬁ catory point. Other kinds of special 
duties are grounded in moral principles such as contribution, compensation 
or contract. Th e holders of these sorts of special non-associative duties may 
also share a prior social relationship, but that does not explain the moral force 
of their duty. For example, some writers have sought to justify national partial-
ity on the grounds that compatriots have contributed to a cooperative enter-
prise and thus incur special rights against each other. 3 Th e fact that the 
compatriots enjoyed a prior social relationship does not add to this argument. 
 1 R. Goodin,  Protecting the Vulnerable (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1985), 
pp. 23-24. 
 2 S. Scheﬄ  er,  Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal 
Th ought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); M. Hardimon, ‘Role Obligations’,  Th e Journal 
of Philosophy 91 (1994), pp. 333-63; I. Honohan, ‘Friends, Strangers or Countrymen? Th e Ties 
between Citizens as Colleagues’,  Political Studies 49.1 (2001), pp. 51-69; D. Jeske, ‘Associative 
Obligations, Voluntarism and Equality’,  Paciﬁ c Philosophical Quarterly 77 (1996), pp. 289-309; 
A. Mason, ‘Special Obligations to Compatriots’,  Ethics 107 (1997), pp. 427-47; S. Reader, 
‘Distance, Relationship and Moral Obligation’,  Th e Monist 86.3 (2003), pp. 367-81. 
 3 See, for example, R. Dagger,  Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship and Republican Liberalism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 46-48; cf. R. Goodin, ‘What’s So Special about our 
Fellow Countrymen?’  Ethics 98 (1988), pp. 663-86 at pp. 675-78. 
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Special associative duties, by contrast, are grounded in the relationship which 
duty-holders and duty-bearers share. 
 Second, I shall assume (a) that the relationships which ground associative 
duties are themselves valuable and (b) it is that moral value which serves to 
justify the duty. (a) need not imply (b). 4 One could argue, for example, that 
the moral value of  X and Y’s relationship is a necessary condition of their 
owing duties to one another, but deny that it is that value which grounds their 
duties. But I shall stipulate that associative duties are justiﬁ ed by the moral 
value of the relationship which participants share. I distinguish this from what 
Wellman calls ‘associativism’, where ‘the fact you are my sister, my colleague, 
or my compatriot is of moral moment independent of any more fundamental 
morally signiﬁ cant features of our relationship’. 5  Pace Wellman, I believe that 
many relationships themselves are morally valuable just because they are con-
stitutive of human ﬂ ourishing. 
 Th ird, while associative duties may be both positive and negative, it is posi-
tive associative duties which seem the more important. Th is is consistent with 
maintaining that associates’ negative duties towards one another may take pre-
cedence over their negative duties towards non-associates. In discussing nega-
tive associative duties, Goodin and Scheﬄ  er both cite as an example the fact 
that it would be less acceptable to harm one’s child, in the course of rescuing 
a stranger, than it would be to harm another stranger. 6 Th at may be true, but 
parents’ central duties to their children are surely positive in nature; to nur-
ture, care for them, and so on. As far as compatriots are concerned, Goodin 
has pointed out elsewhere that there are many ways that we are less obliged to 
avoid harming our fellow citizens than we are strangers, suggesting that nega-
tive duties can be weaker when they are of the associative sort. 7 By contrast, in 
meeting their positive associative duties, people serve their important social 
relationships. 
 Finally, I assume that while associative duties may be perfect or imperfect, 
they are not supererogatory. Supererogatory acts are morally praiseworthy, but 
not morally required. Generosity is an example. Imperfect duties are those we 
have some scope in fulﬁ lling (unlike perfect duties where we do not). We are 
 4 Cf. S. Caney, ‘Individuals, Nations and Obligations’, in S. Caney  et al. (eds.),  National 
Rights, International Obligations (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996). 
 5 C.H. Wellman, ‘Relational Facts in Liberal Political Th eory: Is Th ere Magic in the Pronoun 
“My”?’  Ethics 110 (2000), pp. 537-62, at p. 539. 
 6 Goodin,  Protecting the Vulnerable , pp. 23-24; Scheﬄ  er,  Boundaries and Allegiances , p. 53. 
 7 Goodin,  Protecting the Vulnerable , pp. 671-74. 
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required to meet them, but we can do so in our own way. One reason for this 
assumption is that the main associative duties (neighbourliness perhaps excluded) 
do not appear supererogatory to their bearers. We believe we ought to attend to 
the basic interests of our children, compatriots and so on. On the contrary, it is 
wider non-associative acts such as giving to overseas aid charities which seem 
supererogatory to many people. Another reason for resisting the supererogatory 
classiﬁ cation is that if associative duties were supererogatory, it might be hard to 
distinguish them from mere permissions. Common sense morality may over-
inﬂ ate the scope and stringency of our associative duties, but I think it is right 
to assume that social relationships direct us to act in various ways. 
 Civic Associative Duties 
 Some writers have concluded from the conﬂ ict between civic associative 
duties and global justice that the former do not exist at all: associative duties, 
if they do exist, obtain only between friends, family members and other small 
groups. Let me brieﬂ y defend, therefore, the very idea of civic associative 
duties. 
 Friendship and family life are often thought to exemplify duties between 
associates because of the immediacy and concreteness they exhibit as relation-
ships. However, it is the moral value of social relationships, not the relation-
ships per se, which ground associative duties. We participate in many social 
relationships besides our families and friendship networks and if these also 
foster human ﬂ ourishing it is natural to believe that associative duties can 
obtain in these relationships too. We participate in clubs, communities, asso-
ciations, neighbourhoods, cities, armies, ﬁ rms, churches, schools, universities, 
trade unions and other social forms. Most of these are median groups; we typi-
cally know some of our fellow members but not all of them. Th e associative 
duties which obtain there, however (assuming they do obtain), extend to all 
members qua members, not just those we know. Social relationships of these 
larger kinds are embedded in institutions which through the interconnected 
roles they give members enable them to enjoy mutual relations which are real 
and tangible though nonetheless not immediate. Institutional rules and roles 
enable members to do things together, engaging in common activities, with-
out necessarily sharing personal relationships. Th us colleagues engage in work 
projects together, associations work towards common goals, neighbourhoods 
campaign on issues and so on. Engagement in common activities means that 
those brought together in a certain social relation are not arbitrarily set apart 
from outsiders; they do things together, and through this cooperative activity 
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realize certain goods—community for example—as well as reproducing their 
institution over time. Indeed, it is worth pointing out that families are institu-
tions too. Th ey give their members deﬁ nite roles which have a certain inde-
pendence from their purely personal relationships, and the existence of the 
family—like many other institutions—continues beyond the lives of any of its 
members. 8 
 In political society we engage with other citizens through institutionally 
deﬁ ned common activities. Citizens debate issues, scrutinize their govern-
ment, vote, run for oﬃ  ce, work in public service, pay taxes, claim beneﬁ ts, 
have civil marriages, apply for passports and permits and licences, give infor-
mation to public authorities, recycle their rubbish, call on the police, serve on 
juries, serve in the armed forces, and so on. In doing so, citizens enact their 
roles as citizens and maintain them over time. Th e institutional embeddedness 
of roles and the duties attached to them publicize our activities; in this case 
our activities as citizens. Th us even a fairly private act, like a civil marriage 
ceremony, is one that can be communicated to and understood by one’s fellow 
citizens; and there would be some point in communicating it since they too 
might have a civil marriage. Institutional embeddedness enables us to partici-
pate in more proximate social relationships with larger numbers of people, not 
simply those with whom we have direct contact. Institutions are the medium 
for larger, more complex forms of common activity. 
 Th ere is not the space here properly to defend the moral value of median 
social relationships. Th at would require an extended discussion of modes of 
human ﬂ ourishing and the values constitutive of and in conﬂ ict with them. 
What we can say is that if  ex hypothesi more proximate relationships can 
embody moral value, then it seems somewhat arbitrary to rule out citizenship 
as a relationship too large to do so too. (Opponents of civic associative duties 
sometimes point to Benedict Anderson’s study  Imagined Communities to make 
the point that nations are ﬁ ctitious entities in contrast to the dense reality of 
families and friendship networks. But Anderson stressed that all communities 
besides face-to-face ones are imagined and his point was that an imagined 
community is one  manufactured by its members, not a community which is 
not real). 9 
 To be sure, civic relationships are more slender than the close connections 
we enjoy among friends and in families. But that does not mean their allied 
associative duties do not exist at all. It may only mean that these associative 
 8 Hardimon, ‘Role Obligations’. 
 9 Benedict Anderson,  Imagined Communities (London: Verso 1983 ), p. 14. 
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duties can be outweighed by other more compelling duties. My suspicion is 
that much of the hostility associative duties attract from more cosmopolitan-
minded philosophers stems from the fact that felt associative duties can easily 
be used as a cloak to disguise the self-interest of richer states. But associative 
duties are duties, not self-interest, and if we have them that means only that 
they have some weight when we decide what, on balance, citizens have most 
reason to do. It does not mean that we do not have other duties besides these, 
duties which in certain circumstances may be more powerful. 
 Th e Distributive Objection to Associative Duties 
 I shall now say a little more about global justice, and how precisely its achieve-
ment comes into conﬂ ict with citizens’ associative duties. Suppose, then, that 
the rationale for distributive justice is to provide every person with a decent 
life, some of which requires a fair measure of wealth, resources, opportunities, 
freedom and so on. Plainly, many millions of citizens across the globe lack the 
amounts of these goods necessary to lead decent lives. 10 Th e idea of living a 
decent life, however, the basic metric by which we compare people for pur-
poses of distributive justice, may be glossed in a number of ways. A strong 
egalitarian view would have it that A and B cannot both live decent lives 
unless there is a roughly equal division of the constituents of decency between 
them. Even if that view were rejected, almost all proponents of social justice 
would maintain that if A has less than B we should give priority to A’s basic 
interests. At the very least A’s life should contain suﬃ  cient constituents of 
decency (where suﬃ  ciency is deﬁ ned by reference to an ideal standard and not 
what B holds). Such abstract thoughts animate theorists of global justice. 
Some maintain that the current distribution of global wealth is arbitrary from 
a moral point of view, and hence justice demands a large measure of redistri-
bution. 11 Others argue that richer states’ wealth is the result of theft from what 
was once owned in common by all humankind, and hence richer states owe 
reparative duties to poorer ones. 12 Another suggestion is that citizens in rich 
 10 For the sake of simplicity, I assume throughout that rich states consist of fairly rich (i.e. not 
poor) people and that poor states are home to poor (i.e. not rich) people. Th ough false, I do not 
believe this assumption aﬀ ects the central argument. 
 11 C. Beitz,  Political Th eory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2nd edn, 1999). 
 12 T. Pogge,  World Poverty and Human Rights (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), pp. 203-204. 
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states are complicit in maintaining a global institutional order which harms 
the interests of the global poor, preventing them from living decent lives. 13 
 It is also worth bearing in mind that associative duties grounded in social 
relationships are not the only means by which sceptics of global distributive 
justice have sought to draw a justiﬁ able distinction between duties owed uni-
versally and duties owed to one’s fellow citizens alone. Some argue that only 
citizens experience the degree of economic interdependence which brings 
principles of distributive justice into play. For example, it could be argued that 
citizens are vulnerable to one another’s actions in a way that strangers are not, 
or that the state is a scheme for the mutual advantage of its members. I am 
sceptical of such arguments because it seems to me that economic interdepen-
dence, whether conceived of as vulnerability, advantage or whatever, is a mat-
ter of degree, and if that is so it’s not clear that the scope of justice can be so 
sharply limited to the state. Along related lines, Nagel and Blake have sepa-
rately argued that it is citizens’ shared subjection to coercive laws—laws of 
which they are nonetheless co-authors—which makes justice applicable at the 
state level alone. 14 Again, while there is not the space to consider it in full here, 
this argument too is problematic. It is plausible that the poor overseas are 
subject to coercive measures—indeed that is the thrust of the global institu-
tional order argument mentioned above. If, on the other hand, it is citizens’ 
authorship of the laws which govern them which is important, the argument 
is in danger of being circular unless some way is found of identifying author-
ship independent of the citizenship of a state. In any case, as I said in the ﬁ rst 
clariﬁ catory point at the start of this paper, it is duties grounded in the moral 
value of social relationships which are my focus here. 
 Nagel and Blake both distinguish between global justice, and measures to 
alleviate the absolute deprivation to which so many of the world’s people remain 
subject, and both stress the important of alleviating the latter. 15 Th is highlights 
the important distinction between comparative and non-comparative global 
distributive justice. 16 On a comparative interpretation, person A’s life is less 
decent in part because person B enjoys more resources,  opportunities and free-
dom. Th e strong egalitarian view mentioned above is one  comparative account. 
 13 Pogge,  World Poverty and Human Rights , pp. 112-16, 198-205. 
 14 T. Nagel, ‘Th e Problem of Global Justice’,  Philosophy and Public Aﬀ airs 33 (2005), 
pp. 113-47; M. Blake, ‘Distributive Justice, State Coercion and Autonomy’,  Philosophy and 
Public Aﬀ airs 30 (2001), pp. 257-96. 
 15 Nagel, ‘Th e Problem of Global Justice’, pp. 118-19; Blake, ‘Distributive Justice, State 
Coercion and Autonomy’. 
 16 J. Feinberg, ‘Non-Comparative Justice’,  Philosophical Review 83.3 (1974), pp. 297-358. 
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On a non-comparative interpretation we don’t make direct comparisons 
between the parties to justice: those goods necessary for a decent life are deﬁ ned 
by reference to an abstract standard of decency. (I leave aside the problem of 
how that abstract standard is arrived at.) Th is distinction has crucial implica-
tions for how we understand global justice. On a non-comparative interpreta-
tion, the point of justice is simply to secure citizens’ basic needs. Usually this is 
interpreted as alleviating global poverty. Laudable though this is, it falls short 
of the ideal of comparative global justice where citizens’ interests in living a 
decent life are deﬁ ned by reference to one another. Here the aim is to narrow 
the gap between rich and poor since the size of that gap is relevant for justice. 
(We shall return to this distinction later.) 
 Several writers have explored the way that civic associative duties stand in 
the way of achieving global distributive justice. However, in the essays in his 
book  Boundaries and Allegiances , Samuel Scheﬄ  er has explored the conﬂ ict in 
an especially clear and perspicuous way. For that reason, and because the 
essays have attracted interesting critical comment, I draw on his discussion 
here. 17 Scheﬄ  er imagines two individuals, A and B, who on entering a rela-
tionship of some kind, come to owe associative duties to one another as a 
consequence. 18 Th is works to the detriment of a third party C who is outside 
the relationship and is not the beneﬁ ciary of any associative duties. Th e prior-
ity which A and B, by virtue of their social relationship, give to each other’s 
interests, works systematically to C’s disadvantage. What Scheﬄ  er calls the 
distributive  objection sees C’s omission from A and B’s duty-generating 
relationship as a morally arbitrary exclusion. Th e proper grounds of distribu-
tive justice are the interests of the aﬀ ected parties, and by virtue of 
the relationship they share A and B do not give C’s interests the moral weight 
they deserve. Th e distributive objection thus appeals to the value of 
impartiality. 19 
 Th e problem is that associative duties are constitutive of social relationships 
(though at the same time justiﬁ ed by them), and hence we cannot claim that 
 17 Scheﬄ  er,  Boundaries and Allegiances ; and see E. Ashford, ‘Individual Responsibility and 
Global Consequences’,  Philosophical Books 44.2 (2003), pp. 100-110; Jeske, ‘Associative 
Obligations, Voluntarism and Equality’; J. Kane, ‘Who is my Neighbor? A Response to Scheﬄ  er’, 
in I. Shapiro and L. Brilmayer (eds.),  Global Justice (New York: New York University Press, 
1999); N. Kolodny, ‘Do Associative Duties Matter?’  Journal of Political Philosophy 10.3 (2002), 
pp. 250-66; D. Miller, ‘Liberalism, Desert and Special Responsibilities’,  Philosophical Books 44.2 
(2003), pp. 111-17. 
 18 Scheﬄ  er,  Boundaries and Allegiances , pp. 56-58. 
 19 Jeske, ‘Associative Obligations, Voluntarism and Equality’, p. 299. 
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A and B share a relationship, as compatriots for example, without at the same 
time conceding that they owe duties to one another on that account. 20 Of 
course, a poorer citizen such as C will also have a compatriot, D, on whom she 
too can make claims. But the distributive objection points not to the lesser 
stringency of C’s claim on D compared to A’s claim on B but to the more 
limited wealth to which C and D have access, compared with that which A 
and B can command. 
 While associative duties obtain in diﬀ erent kinds of social relationships, 
Scheﬄ  er suggests (correctly, I believe) that the distributive objection is most 
acute at the global level.  21 His view is that the moral claims arising from asso-
ciative duties can never ﬁ nally be reconciled with the impartial concern 
required by global distributive justice. Th e plausibility of this conclusion 
depends in part on whether global justice is conceived of in comparative or 
non-comparative terms. While the distributive objection could be directed at 
non-comparative justice, it is credible to claim that poorer people’s basic needs 
could be met while at the same time richer citizens fulﬁ lled their associative 
duties to one another. Only if the latter were relatively weighty and/or if the 
normative threshold of a decent life was set fairly high would the distributive 
objection become apposite. But if global justice is conceived of in comparative 
terms, it is not obvious how the distributive objection could be avoided. 
Comparative global justice grounded in impartial concern for all the world’s 
people means that citizens’ universal duties to strangers overseas are demand-
ing indeed, and it is diﬃ  cult to see how they could owe further associative 
duties to one another without jeopardizing the former. Th is seems to be 
Scheﬄ  er’s main concern too because of his interest in how C loses out just 
because A and B are fellow citizens. 
 Achieving Global Justice 
 How might we best respond to the distributive objection to civic associative 
duties in the face of global injustice? Th e ﬁ rst response I shall consider ques-
tions how far that objection aﬀ ects the reality of how global justice would be 
achieved. Scheﬄ  er’s spare illustrative methodology may encourage us to think 
that the only way for rich states A and B to avoid liability to the distributive 
objection is to transfer resources to poor state C, their mutual associative 
 20 Scheﬄ  er,  Boundaries and Allegiances , pp. 59, 92-93, 100. 
 21 Scheﬄ  er,  Boundaries and Allegiances , p. 58. 
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duties notwithstanding. 22 But two considerations complicate this simple view 
of how poor states such as B could become better oﬀ . Th e ﬁ rst is that states 
engage in signiﬁ cant economic interchange and by implication individuals in 
rich states A and B will very often have an economic (though not an associa-
tive) relationship with individuals in poor state C. Second and relatedly, the 
most eﬀ ective way for individuals in C to become richer is through their own 
economic eﬀ orts, including economic trade with other states such as A 
and B. 
 What makes some states rich and others poor is a diﬃ  cult question, much 
discussed in the global justice literature. Some combination of resource-
holdings, economic growth, the functioning of global markets, climate, geo-
graphical location, education and productivity of the workforce, stable 
property rights, the rule of law, bureaucratic capacity, good governance and 
social cohesiveness and trust all seem to play a part, and diﬀ erent factors may 
well be predominant in diﬀ erent states. 23 For global wealth inequalities to be 
a distributive injustice we need only assume that some salient causes of those 
inequalities are to some degree beyond the control of poorer states and to 
some degree within the control of richer ones. 24 But how that injustice is, 
morally and practically speaking, best addressed is not an easy question. (For 
one thing, what is morally desirable may at times conﬂ ict with what is practi-
cally most eﬃ  cacious.) Writers and activists call for a variety of concrete mea-
sures to alleviate global injustice. For example, they urge the abolition of 
export subsidies, tariﬀ s and import quotas to promote fair trade. Th ey want to 
see debt cancellation, and the democratic reform of the international ﬁ nancial 
institutions which impose them. Th ey call for good governance for its own 
sake and as a vital pre-requisite for economic prosperity (it would also increase 
foreign direct investment). Universal free education, it is argued, would better 
enable future generations to compete in world markets. Besides ending a 
human tragedy, human capital would also be improved through the eradica-
tion of diseases such as AIDS and malaria. Challenging social norms such as 
those that prefer male children or restrict women to a child-bearing role would 
 22 Th is assumption is also made by some cosmopolitan writers. See, for example, Beitz, 
 Political Th eory and International Relations ; Kolodny, ‘Do Associative Duties Matter?’; H. Shue, 
 Basic Rights: Subsistence, Aﬄ  uence and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2nd edn, 1996). 
 23 M. Risse, ‘How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor?’,  Philosophy and Public Aﬀ airs 33.4 
(2005), pp. 349-76 at pp. 355-56. 
 24 Here I leave aside the problem of democracy: how far the actions of—especially poorer—
states’ leaders reﬂ ect their citizens’ choices. 
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likely have a positive impact on developing states’ prosperity. So too would 
development and increased private charitable donations. 
 Th ere are naturally complex interdependencies between these diﬀ erent fac-
tors, varying local situations across developing countries, and debates among 
academics, activists and politicians about how precisely to achieve global jus-
tice. All this serves to establish an important general point: we will not achieve 
global distributive justice in a non-comparative or, in the long term, a com-
parative sense simply through richer states channelling an ever greater propor-
tion of their public spending overseas. Poor countries are not made richer by 
rich countries getting poorer. We will achieve it through some combination of 
fair trade, debt cancellation, global democracy, good governance in developing 
states, improved education, eradication of serious diseases and so on, together 
with some measure of tax-ﬁ nanced oﬃ  cial development aid. Th is empirical 
conclusion shows that, insofar as the distributive objection assumes that the 
way to make poorer people richer is through wealth redistribution from rich 
to poor the objection is misplaced. In consequence, it may not be unjust for 
developed states to spend more per capita on their own citizens than people 
overseas provided they undertake the other sorts of measures outlined above 
to help developing states help themselves. Th ey will likely still need to aug-
ment their foreign aid budgets, but that is only one part of achieving global 
justice. For all the factors above are concerned with strengthening the ability 
of members of poorer states to generate their own wealth and opportunity. 
Th is may seem to erode some of the moral force of the distributive objection. 
 Th ese considerations do not, however, show that the distributive objection 
is merely a theoretical problem. On one interpretation of it, the objection does 
assume that wealth redistribution is the main way to achieve global justice. 
But it also can be recast to include some of the factors canvassed above. To 
begin with, there are still ﬁ nancial implications involved in better-oﬀ  states 
abolishing subsidies, tariﬀ s and import quotas, cancelling debts, promoting 
health and education overseas, and so on. Further, since the wealth held by 
individuals and institutions is ﬁ nite, there are also ﬁ nancial implications in 
any transfers made overseas by them: loans, investment or charitable dona-
tions may mean less is available for domestic goals. Importantly, many of the 
measures listed above, while not primarily redistributive in nature, still demand 
substantial eﬀ ort on the part of richer states’ citizens to achieve. Reforming 
supranational institutions, negotiating fairer global trade, encouraging good 
governance overseas, promoting a liberal culture in illiberal states and so on, 
all require time, energy, eﬀ ort and attention, not least because of the coordina-
tion necessary among the actors involved. We do not need to have to hand a 
common metric to measure the comparative burdensomeness of diﬀ erent sorts 
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of positive duties, to realize that these non-distributive duties too may threaten 
the fulﬁ lment of compatriots’ associative duties. Reversing the point, if politi-
cal leaders devote most of their time and energy to their own citizens’ interests, 
they will have little left to attend to the interests of the global poor. Provided 
we assume that poorer states cannot develop their own economies without 
substantial external assistance, comparative global justice will remain a far-oﬀ  
aspiration. In sum, the practicalities of achieving global justice reveal that a 
conﬂ ict remains between fulﬁ lling associative and universal duties. Th e dis-
tributive objection thus remains largely intact. 
 Th e Additional Duties Defence of Associative Duties 
 Th e second reply to the distributive objection is more philosophical. It says 
that associative duties do not compete with the duties we owe to strangers, but 
rather supplement them. Pogge, for example, contends that associative duties 
that arise from particular relationships are permissible provided that we do 
not, on their account, owe less to non-associates than we would have owed 
them in the absence of the relationship. ‘[S]pecial relationships can increase 
what we owe to our associates’, he writes, ‘but they cannot decrease what we 
owe to everyone else’. 25 Similarly, Jeske, imagining a situation in which I must 
attend to the interests of Henry (a stranger) and Emma (to whom I owe spe-
cial obligations), argues that ‘I must continue to give Henry’s needs the same 
weight in deliberations as I would have given to those needs if I did not have 
special obligations to Emma’. 26 On this view, then, we ﬁ rst arrive at a notion 
of those positive duties we justiﬁ ably owe to others, and then augment what 
we owe to associates on the grounds that we share relationships only with 
them. I shall call this the additional duties defence of associative duties. 
 Scheﬄ  er himself sees a problem with the additional duties defence. 27 
According to him, the defence concedes that the moral claims of associates are 
greater than those of strangers which is just what the distributive objection 
takes issue with. Th e distributive objection attacks the idea that we have greater 
 25 T. Pogge, ‘Cosmopolitanism: A Defence’,  Critical Review of Social and Political Philosophy 
5.3 (2002), pp. 86-91 at 90-91; cf. Pogge,  World Poverty and Human Rights , pp. 78-79; cf. 
K.-C. Tan,  Justice Without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism and Patriotism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 163-79. 
 26 Jeske, ‘Associative Obligations, Voluntarism and Equality’, p. 300. 
 27 Scheﬄ  er,  Boundaries and Allegiances , pp. 86-87; cf. S. Scheﬄ  er, ‘Replies to Ashford, Miller 
and Rosen’,  Philosophical Books 44.2 (2003), pp. 125-34 at pp. 128-29. 
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responsibilities to associates than non-associates. Hence, he argues, if the addi-
tional duties defence were correct, it would rebut the distributive objection, 
but in doing so ‘it would nevertheless grant the conclusion that objection 
seeks to establish’. 28 On this view, the additional duties defence is self-
defeating because it concedes our duty to give greater weight to associates’ 
interests than non-associates’ interests, and that is unjust. But how convincing 
is Scheﬄ  er’s reply? If we deliver to strangers the substantial duties that justice 
requires need there be a wrong involved in giving greater weight still to the 
interests of associates? Th e distributive objection to associative duties is trig-
gered if A and B, by virtue of their associative relationship, do not give stranger 
C’s interests the moral weight they deserve. But provided that A and B take 
care to give C’s interests the same substantial weight in their moral delibera-
tions about what each of them owes C that they would absent their own duty-
generating relationship, there is no obvious distributive objection if A and B 
can make an extra claim on each other in addition. Further, this reply seems 
consistent with the empirical reply to the distributive objection discussed 
above. Suppose state A devoted the time, eﬀ ort, money and so on which is its 
proper moral share of the work needed to achieve global justice. Is any injus-
tice  necessarily involved if A’s citizens owed associative duties to one another in 
addition? 
 Th is returns us to Pogge’s and Jeske’s view that associative duties are legiti-
mate if and only if they are additional to those we have towards non-associates. 
Th ere is another objection to this view, however, which can be presented via a 
dilemma. On the one hand, if we ﬁ rst discharge the duties to strangers which 
global justice requires, it is not clear that we really do owe associates substantial 
duties in addition. On the other hand, if we do owe associates signiﬁ cant 
duties, then, as Scheﬄ  er recognizes, there seems good reason to think we will 
fall short of what our global justice duties morally require. Take the ﬁ rst horn 
of the dilemma ﬁ rst. We noted the fairly obvious point that achieving global 
justice is a colossal task that requires substantial time, eﬀ ort, energy and (not 
least) money on the part of rich states and their citizens. It requires continual 
work, over a substantial period, until such time as citizens in what are now 
poorer states have increased their wealth and opportunity to such a degree that 
the demands of some global comparative principle are satisﬁ ed. Plainly, since 
the world is marked by such huge wealth disparities, citizens in better-oﬀ  states 
would need to increase the moral weight they accord to strangers’ interests by 
several orders of magnitude in order to diminish the current  comparative gap. 
 28 Scheﬄ  er,  Boundaries and Allegiances , p. 86. 
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If this is the case, however, it is not certain whether there are signiﬁ cant extra 
associative duties that citizens in rich states would owe one another in addi-
tion. I stipulated earlier that (consistent with common usage) associative duties 
are not merely permissions: they are positive actions that citizens ought to 
perform for one another. But under comparative justice the duties owed to 
strangers are weighty indeed, for they are grounded in some notion of impar-
tiality across borders. Th us while, as I have maintained, it is not in principle 
unjust for a rich state’s citizens to owe one another additional associative duties 
if they meet their global justice duties, the demands of justice towards the 
global poor may not leave very much to be owed. Th ere would be a strong 
argument that any substantial associative duties that richer citizens owed each 
other, any surplus, as it were, at their command, ought ﬁ rst to be redirected 
towards worse-oﬀ  strangers. 
 On the second horn of the dilemma, global justice is deﬁ ned in non-
comparative terms, for example by reference to people’s basic needs. Th e cor-
responding duties of citizens in richer states are consequently less demanding. 
Th ey involve ensuring that all the world’s people enjoy lives above a certain 
threshold of decency. Consistent with this, richer states’ citizens might owe 
each other something extra: the value of their citizenship could plausibly 
involve civic associative duties denied to those outside the relevant duty-
generating relationships. Th e additional duties defence could, on this interpre-
tation, succeed. In the grossly unjust world in which we live we should not 
under-estimate how much of an achievement it would be if every person could 
live a decent life. But such measures would still fall foul of the distributive 
objection which questions whether citizens in the rich world can enjoy so 
much more than the poor for morally arbitrary reasons. Global justice, as 
most of its advocates understand it, would not have been achieved. Either for 
this reason, therefore, or because, as maintained above, more impartially-
minded citizens could not owe one another signiﬁ cant duties if they owed 
substantial duties to strangers, the additional duties defence does not seem 
likely to succeed. 
 Defending Associative Duties 
 In this section I outline a third—and, I believe, more promising—strategy to 
defend associative duties and defuse the distributive objection. To begin with, 
consider brieﬂ y what civic associative duties might consist in and why that 
might be thought valuable. Th us many people believe that citizens have duties 
to their fellow citizens to maintain an eﬀ ective welfare state on the grounds 
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that through the domestic social justice the welfare state helps secure, better-
oﬀ  citizens foster the citizenship they share with their poorer compatriots. 
Associative duties, in other words, are grounded in their common member-
ship of a civic community. 29 Speciﬁ cally, citizens have duties to maintain insti-
tutions such as a properly functioning health service, an education system 
which prepares young people for their society’s labour market and for citizen-
ship, and to underwrite reasonable state-ﬁ nanced provision for the poor, the 
old, the disabled and other vulnerable groups. Performing these sorts of duties 
strengthens the bonds that exist between citizens and helps each citizen feel, 
with justiﬁ cation, that she is a member in full standing of a larger civic com-
munity. Citizenship, on this view, is a collective political project, and it is 
made so, in large part, because of the positive duties of justice that citizens 
deliver to one another. Moreover, in a liberal democratic state, citizens have 
also an input into determining the nature of their socio-economic provision. 
Besides helping realize civic community, citizenship is also valuable because 
through it citizens have an input in co-determining the conditions of their 
collective life with each other. 30 Most valuable relationships are valuable in 
part because participants in them are able to negotiate their terms, and the 
claims and demands they can make on one another, and the goods they co-
produce. Citizenship is no exception. Th us through their more political civic 
associative duties—duties to take an interest in public aﬀ airs, to scrutinize 
their government, to vote—they also realize the value of democracy. 31 
 Certainly, this sketch could be contested. It may seem, for example, to 
assume a rather republican understanding of citizenship. But it is not, I hope, 
implausible. My aim here is not to spell out precisely what civic associative 
duties involve but to show, in general terms, how they might survive the dis-
tributive objection. 
 One feature of this account is that it does not at base involve the notion of 
priority. Citizens have no duty to put each other’s interests ahead of non-
citizens; their basic duties are simply to realize the values of civic community 
and democracy. 32 Th ose basic duties are realized by more speciﬁ c duties such as 
 29 Cf. D. Harris,  Justifying State Welfare (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987); Miller, ‘Liberalism, Desert 
and Special Responsibilities’, pp. 115-17. 
 30 Mason, ‘Special Obligations to Compatriots’, p. 442. 
 31 Cf. Honohan, ‘Friends, Strangers or Countrymen?’, pp. 59-64 . 
 32 A more apposite problem might appear to be that civic associative duties, while grounded 
in the values of civic community and democracy, also serve those values: it is by meeting their 
associative duties that community and democracy are promoted. Th is seems circular since the 
grounds of duties are also the eﬀ ects of meeting them. However, citizenship involves more than 
simply the duties that citizens owe one another (Mason, Special Obligations to Compatriots’,
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paying taxes and debating issues, and through meeting these duties they help 
achieve these values. But, as a group of individuals who engage in (duty-
generating) common activities, citizens have no duty to rank each other’s inter-
ests ahead of outsiders. Th eir duties simply involve meeting each other’s 
interests. Th e grounds of their duties—civic community and democracy—are 
values in and of themselves; they do not direct participants to rank each other’s 
interests before those of strangers. After all, citizens in poorer states also have 
associative duties, and they too may be able to realize the values of civic com-
munity and democracy without putting each other’s interests ahead of rich 
outsiders. Th is may seem, however, disingenuous. While the root justiﬁ cation 
of these civic associative duties may not be prioritarian, their practical eﬀ ect 
certainly is. Welfarist associative duties involve money, and in a world where 
wealth is so hugely unevenly distributed the eﬀ ect of rich states meeting these 
duties will be that the interests of poorer peoples in living a decent life are not 
adequately met. Even realizing the democratic values in better-oﬀ  states, insofar 
as they involve citizens’ time and energy, may well prejudice the interests of the 
global poor. In practice if not in theory, then, meeting our global justice duties 
will slip down the political agenda if associative duties are suﬃ  ciently strong. 
 Th ere are two replies to this practical objection. Th e ﬁ rst points out that 
just because associative duties are outweighed by other duties does not mean 
they are not duties. Th e second is to outline circumstances in which they are 
not outweighed. 
 Civic community and democracy in richer states would not collapse if poli-
ticians and citizens in those states spent the time, energy and money necessary 
to deliver their global justice duties. What is true is they may not be realized as 
much as they might if the latter kinds of duties were adequately fulﬁ lled. 
A more basic welfarist system might foster less of a civic communitarian ethos 
than a more comprehensive one. If, counterfactually, richer states’ citizens 
devoted more time, eﬀ ort and energy to the needs of the global poor then by 
implication they would devote less to democracy and civic life in their own 
society. Th e latter values would then not be realized to the degree that they 
might. Short of spelling out in more detail what our civic associative and global 
justice duties involve, we do not know precisely what the comparative gains 
and losses would be. We do, however, know that constructing a world which 
is just (in comparative terms) is a hugely demanding task. It involves increased 
pp. 439-47; cf. J. Raz, ‘Liberating Duties’,  Law and Philosophy 8 [1999], pp. 3-21 at p. 21). 
Citizenship is a value, a shared sentiment, a legal status, a symbol of belonging and part of the 
meaning of a state: these things also are fostered by civic associative duties, but they are not 
directly the object of them. We thus avoid the problem of citizenship being justiﬁ ed by just what 
it is that citizens qua citizens have a duty to do. 
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development aid; creating conditions in which poorer states can enjoy eco-
nomic growth: fair international trade and eﬀ ective supra-international insti-
tutions to regulate it, as well as measures to promote democracy and social 
capital in developing states, and so on. Th e likelihood is that this would have 
a negative impact on the fulﬁ lment of our civic associative duties, and hence 
on the achievement of their constitutive values. 
 However, claiming that a duty is eroded, or even over-ridden, by the perfor-
mance of another duty is quite diﬀ erent from claiming that it disappears, even 
if in practice the two situations look the same from the outside. Th e values 
which associative duties serve—civic community and democracy—are univer-
sal ones and remain signiﬁ cant whatever the situation in other states and the 
world as a whole. Civic community and democracy do not suddenly lose their 
importance just because there are other duties that are more urgent and com-
pelling. We quite often face conﬂ icts of duties, but when we decide that meet-
ing one duty is more morally urgent than another, we still feel the pull of the 
less compelling duty. Saving ten people from drowning does not mean the 
duty to save one person elsewhere from drowning suddenly goes away. In fact, 
situations in which attending to an important harm or wrong get in the way of 
meeting our associative duties are not uncommon in everyday life. You might 
be called upon to give ﬁ rst aid to victims of a road accident on your way home, 
for example, or you might take up Oxfam’s invitation and buy a goat for an 
African village instead of giving your friend a birthday present. Duties do not 
magically disappear when other more powerful duties intrude. What is true is 
that very few, if any, duties, are of such moral power that they take priority 
across the board, in every situation. Civic associative duties give citizens a 
strong  prima facie reason to engage in certain activities. I have claimed that 
that reason can be articulated through the values that associative duties serve. 
 Having said that, civic associative duties would be an odd kind of duty if 
they were  always outweighed. To make credible the claim that they exist, it will 
therefore help to outline the circumstances in which they may be substantially 
fulﬁ lled. Again, it is diﬃ  cult to do this without a full speciﬁ cation of what 
associative (and non-associative) duties involve, but the following sketch, I 
hope, gives an idea. 
 My suggestion is that associative duties can be performed alongside univer-
sal duties in ideal circumstances. 33 I use the phrase ideal circumstances rather 
 33 For a similar idea, though not developed, see Jocelyne Couture and Kai Nielsen, 
‘Cosmopolitanism and the Compatriot Priority Principle’, in Gillian Brock and Harry Brighouse 
(eds),  Th e Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005). 
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than ideal theory partly because ideal theory is deﬁ ned in diﬀ erent ways by 
diﬀ erent writers—sometimes as full compliance with our moral duties, 34 
sometimes as the claim that normative truths are independent of empirical 
ones 35 and sometimes as moral theory that does not oﬀ er guidance on real 
world problems 36 —but also because my concern is not so much with the 
nature of normative theory as in a situation in which global justice, deﬁ ned in 
comparative terms, ﬁ nally obtains. We have to imagine a world in which the 
distribution of wealth and opportunities satisﬁ ed some recognized principle 
of social justice, however far removed that is from our present reality. To sim-
plify matters, we might imagine a world of two states, A and B, neither of 
which is much wealthier than the other. A and B trade with each other. A sells 
B goods in which it specializes, and B does the same. Suppose there is perfect 
free trade with no tariﬀ s or quotas, and goods are bought and sold at the mar-
ket rate. Such a situation should be advantageous to both states so that their 
economies grow. Now both A’s and B’s citizens are concerned with civic com-
munity and democracy in their own societies. Each therefore ﬁ nances an 
eﬀ ective welfare state and each ensures that their citizens’ public standing—in 
part a function of their material well-being—is such that they can have a 
genuine input into public deliberation on the direction of their society. Th e 
two states’ citizens have duties to realize the values of civic community and 
democracy, and this sees them devoting more time, energy and money to each 
other’s interests, than to the interests of citizens in the other state. Th at is the 
practical sense in which associative duties involve the idea of priority. It is also 
the only sense. As explained above, the grounds of associative duties are just 
to realize certain values where one lives; this does not involve winning a race, 
as it were, against the other state. We can make sense of associative duties 
through the claim that A’s and B’s citizens, through their common civic activi-
ties, can enjoy a certain sort of collective ﬂ ourishing. Th ere is no need to stipu-
late that associative duties are only satisﬁ ed if A is better oﬀ  than B, or vice 
versa. 
 Now this happy situation may not obtain forever. Perhaps B’s government 
make less than wise economic decisions, and its economy stalls, or A’s citizens 
work harder and its economy grows at a faster rate. A’s citizens’ global justice 
 34 Liam Murphy,  Moral Demands in Non-Ideal Th eory (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2000). 
 35 G.A. Cohen, ‘Facts and Principles’,  Philosophy and Public Aﬀ airs 31 (2003), pp. 211-45; 
Andrew Mason, ‘Just Constraints’,  British Journal of Political Science 34 (2004), pp. 251-68. 
 36 Colin Farrelly, ‘Justice in Ideal Th eory: A Refutation’,  Political Studies 55.4 (2007), 
pp. 844-64. 
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duties might therefore for a time become more substantial, as it seeks to assist 
B, and this would likely have a negative impact on welfarist spending in A, as 
well as limiting its democratic freedom to determine its future. But this would 
not cause its civic associative duties to disappear. Th ey would simply be 
trumped for a time until global justice once again obtained. 
 For an example closer to home and to current realities, consider the distri-
bution of wealth and income in contemporary liberal democracies, and the 
duties between family members. Th e latter (it is plausible to think) are justi-
ﬁ ed by the values of love, care and intimate association. Familial associative 
duties need not direct family members to make themselves better oﬀ  than 
strangers. Th ey do naturally involve family members being more committed 
to fulﬁ lling each other’s needs than strangers’: through such commitment the 
distinctive familial modes of ﬂ ourishing—constituted by values such as love, 
care and intimate association—are realized. I don’t think it’s unrealistic to 
believe that such ﬂ ourishing may be consistent with achieving a just distribu-
tion of wealth and income in society. 
 What would Scheﬄ  er make of the defence of associative duties outlined 
above? He might interpret it through the claim that the scope and stringency 
of associative duties may seem, on this account, to be limited by what global 
justice duties require. A counter-argument would then be that this gives global 
justice priority over associative duties in which case the distinctive nature, as 
well as appeal, of the latter is eroded. Now this is a convincing objection to 
what I called the additional duties defence of associative duties. For on that 
defence we do ﬁ rst determine what non-associative duties of justice we owe 
strangers, and I suggested that if these were demanding enough they would 
not leave citizens with signiﬁ cant duties to one another (though they would be 
permitted to act within just bounds). But the defence above does not under-
stand priority in this way. It distinguishes between the grounds of duties—the 
values which justify them and which they serve—and their concrete practical 
demands. Civic community and democracy are instances of the former. Th ey 
have intrinsic value for the citizens of a particular state independent of the 
position of citizens of other states. Th e practical demands they make as duties, 
by contrast, do vary with context. In our present context the demands of 
global justice do take priority but that need not always be the case. Which 
duty gives us the strongest reason to do something depends upon the situation 
we face. If associative duties  always took priority over non-associative duties 
they would be a strange sort of duty because duties are justiﬁ ed by values and 
one normally compelling value can be over-ridden by considerations of greater 
moral importance in certain circumstances. I have suggested by contrast that 
associative duties behave much like other kinds of duties. Th ey are more than 
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simply permissions; they give us reasons to do things, they serve important 
values and they are not absolute. 
 Conclusion 
 Associative duties owed to compatriots are ﬁ rmly embedded in the common 
moral consciousness. Th at does not mean they are correct, but it seems to me 
a more fruitful strategy to see if we can re-interpret the intuitions of common 
sense morality, channelling them in a more progressive direction so as to rec-
oncile them with our considered moral principles, rather than abandoning 
them altogether just because they do conﬂ ict. Proponents of associative duties 
tend to defend them by claiming that the interests they serve are of such value 
that they outweigh the performance of our global justice duties, at least if the 
latter are interpreted in a more demanding comparative sense. 37 Th e problem 
with this sort of defence is that given the grievous wrong that global inequality 
represents, we would have to attach inordinate value to those interests and it 
seems unlikely that citizens’ interests can have that extraordinary importance. 
Cosmopolitan critics of associative duties tend to claim that because they 
come into conﬂ ict with global justice duties, they probably don’t exist at all, 
especially as states seem just too large for their members to owe one another 
associative duties compared to groups of friends and families. Th e ﬁ rst plank 
of a defence of civic associative duties consists in showing how political insti-
tutions enable relatively stable and enduring mediated relationships where, by 
virtue of their collective institutional membership, citizens can engage in com-
mon activities. Th e second plank is the claim that such common activities 
realized certain values, and I suggested civic community and democracy were 
one plausible interpretation of those values. Th e third plank maintained that 
those values did not go away if citizens’ activities were redirected (in large part) 
towards outsiders’ interests. Finally, we can at least imagine a situation where 
people’s interests as citizens are met largely by their own compatriots, enabling 
civic community and democracy to ﬂ ourish in the world more than they cur-
rently do. In the end, most people’s intuition that they owe their compatriots 
a peculiar form of duty is correct; where ordinary thinking goes wrong is sim-
ply in over-estimating that duty’s potency and power. 
 37 See Wellman, ‘Relational Facts in Liberal Political Th eory’; and David Miller, ‘Reasonable 
Partiality towards Compatriots’,  Ethical Th eory in Moral Practice 8.1 (2005), pp. 63-81. 
